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Herd Behavior in the Japanese Loan Market:
Evidence from Bank Panel Data
Abstract
This paper investigates whether Japanese banks had been following herd
behavior in the domestic loan market from 1975 through 2002. Applying
the technique developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (LSV) (1992,
J. of Fin. Econ.) to the data of loans outstanding to diﬀerent types of
borrowers, we obtain evidence indicative of the existence of herding. Con-
sistent herding during the entire sample period is observed among regional
banks, whereas city banks had been following a cyclical herd behavior with
one peak around the bubble period in the late 1980s. Even after adjusting
for herding resulting from rational or institutional factors, we still observe
herding for regional banks in the entire period, whereas herding only in the
bubble period remains for city banks. The results would indicate that re-
gional banks had been consistently following irrational herd behavior, while
city banks were frantic enough to herd only in the bubble period in the late
1980s.
Keywords: herd behavior, LSV herding measure, adjusted herding mea-
sure, banks, loan market, Japan
JEL classification number: C12, G14, G23
1 Introduction
Are Japanese banks rational? This question has been asked in diﬀerent con-
texts, even after the argument of ’culturally diﬀerent’ Japanese firms being
out of the economic principle of profit maximization became obsolete. One
of the oft-quoted characteristics of Japanese banks regarding this question
is herd behavior. Anecdotal evidence can easily be obtained from articles
of the Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei), a Japanese newspaper comparable
to the Wall Street Journal. From January 1, 1975 through December 31,
2002, database search through the Nikkei Telecom 21 Article Search Service
yielded 1,287 articles in Nikkei containing the words ”yokonarabi (herding)”
and ”ginko (banks).” We have had a lot of incidence of herding in, for exam-
ple, setting deposit interest rates, business hours, and diﬀerent fees in earlier
years of this period. Herding about where and how much to lend is one of
them. In later years of the period, on the contrary, we gradually observe a
lot of incidence indicating the corruption of herding due to the hardening
business condition for and increased competition among Japanese banks.
One of the phenomena which one would connect to herding must be the
behavior of Japanese banks during the bubble period from the late 1980s.
In that period, there was huge collective influx of loan funds into diﬀerent
industries. Such behavior by banks is regarded as herd behavior and often
accused as a factor that accelerated the formation of the bubble.
We have other naive evidence of herding for Japanese banks. In the high
growth period, the ”convoy system” was paid attention to in which Japanese
banks were claimed to be herding to keep the weakest member alive with
the aid of regulation and protection by the Ministry of Finance. After the
bubble period, a lot of Japanese banks have been uniformly suﬀering from
bad loans and tried to contract their lending, which is blamed to be a cause
of ’credit crunch.’
Anecdotal evidence like this is based on little empirical analysis. In fact,
few empirical studies have been conducted about herd behavior of Japanese
banks. Did herd behavior exist among Japanese banks first of all? What
driving force was there to motivate such a behavior, if any? These important
questions must be answered based on a formal empirical study. The aim of
this paper is to investigate whether and why, if any, Japanese banks had
been following herd behavior in these 30 years.
Our methodology is indebted to the study of herd behavior among fund
managers. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny[17] (henceforth LSV) devised
an innovative index to measure the extent to which fund managers follow
herd behavior in investing in equity stocks. The measure, called the LSV
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measure, captures the extent to which fund managers deviate from indepen-
dent investment decision to collectively buy and sell specific stocks in the
same direction. Due to its simplicity and great economic appeal, the mea-
sure received big popularity and was applied to investigate herd behavior in
diﬀerent contexts by a lot of studies that followed.1
We apply the measure to find out the existence or nonexistence of herd
behavior among Japanese banks. The data to be used are of loans outstand-
ing of individual banks to diﬀerent industries which are available from the
Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File. It allows us to calculate the
LSV measure for loans from about 140 commercial banks to 11 diﬀerent
industries during the period of 1975 through 2002. We calculated the mea-
sures separately for two types of commercial banks in Japan, regional banks
and city banks.
The results demonstrate the existence of herd behavior among Japanese
banks during the sample period. For regional banks, herding was observed
consistently throughout the period. The herding had been significant both
economically and statistically. In contrast, city banks had followed a cyclical
herding pattern. Interestingly, herding is observed during the bubble period
in the late 1980s and the stagnation period that follows. In these periods,
herding among city banks was severer than regional banks. These results
are consistent with our image of banks frantic enough to rush in lending to
bubble industries. After 1997 when banks were facing severer competition,
they cease to herd each other.
Even if herd behavior is detected by the LSV measure, however, it does
not necessary imply irrational banks. The LSV measure just quantifies the
extent of banks’ collective deviation from each year’s average lending pol-
icy. The deviation could result from rational behavior. As a matter of fact,
theoretical studies have been clarified that variety of rational reasons could
lead to herd behavior, although it is basically diﬃcult to discern empirically
what caused detected herd behavior.2 The deviation could also result from
1For example, see Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers[10], Wermers[22], Choe et al.[11],
Borensztein and Gelos[4], Gelos and Wei[9], and Kim and Wei[16, 15].
2Herd behavior could result (i) among fund managers with a similar comparative ad-
vantage (Falkenstein[7]), (ii) when there is some kind of payoﬀ externalities in following
the herd (e.g. bank run in Diamond and Dybvig[6], liquidity in Devenow and Welch[5],
and information production in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein[8] and Hirshleifer, Subrah-
manyam, and Titman[12]), (iii) from reputation concern (Scharfstein and Stein[20]), (iv)
based on common information, and (v) through inference from behavior of other agents
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch[2] and Banerjee[1]). See Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch[3], Devenow and Welch[5], and Nakagawa and Uchida[18] for survey.
It is diﬃcult to empirically figure out what cause brought about herding, but we can at
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institutional reasons. During the period from 1975 through 2002, Japanese
banks had experienced the second oil crisis, financial liberalization, the bub-
ble, and post bubble stagnation. Expanding or shrunk loan demand due to
these drastic environmental changes could have made Japanese banks be-
have as if they had been following herd behavior.
In order to extract a purely irrational portion of herding, we regressed
the extent of banks’ collective deviation from the average lending policy
on proxies for rational and institutional factors. By using the resulting
residual, we created an adjusted herding measure which does not contain
rational or institutional factors. The results show that even after adjusting
for these factors, consistency for regional bank herding was still observed.
For city banks, in contrast, most of the herding disappeared through this
adjustment. However, a large extent of herd behavior was still observed in
the bubble period of the late 1980s. As city banks have been dominant in
the loan market in Japan, the results for this period might imply that their
irrational behavior could have caused or accelerated the formation of the
bubble.
The results obtained in this paper are consistent with the competitive
nature of Japanese banks obtained in Uchida and Tsutsui[21]. Based on
the theory of industrial organization, they estimate the degree of compe-
tition among Japanese banks. Their results show that regional banks had
been consistently under less stringent competitive pressure than city banks
throughout the period from 1974 to 2000. Together with the results ob-
tained in this paper, we could conclude that banks under tight competition
cannot aﬀord to follow herd behavior.3
There is an attempt to clarify whether Japanese banks had been following
herd behavior. Based upon Jain and Gupta[13], Nakagawa and Uchida[18]
least exclude reasons (i) through (iii) as a cause of herding detected here. First, Japanese
banks might have had respective comparative advantage in lending to firms with a specific
size or a specific region. However they are unlikely to have one in lending to a specific
industry. As our dataset contains each bank’s loans outstanding only at the industry
level, we can exclude explanation (i). Second, at an industry level, one bank’s lending is
not likely to positively aﬀect other banks’ lending, which excludes the explanation (ii).
Finally, we could not infer any bank manager’s ability based upon their performance of
lending to a particular industry. This allows us to disregard explanation (iii).
3A less stringent competitive environment for regional banks might have been due to
regional segmentation of their markets. One might then wonder that banks as regional
monopolists would not follow herd behavior at all, which contradicts to the evidence
obtained in this paper. However, Kano and Tsutsui[14] demonstrates that markets for
regional banks were not segmented for regional banks. Together with the results of Uchida
and Tsutsui[21], regional banks were under competition even if it was not very severe. The
result of consistent herding is thus not contradictory.
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try to detect the causality relationship between loans outstanding by diﬀer-
ent types of banks. They find the existence of the causality from city banks
to regional banks, from long-term credit banks to city banks, and from trust
banks to city banks. Their focus is thus on herd behavior between diﬀerent
types of Japanese banks, while we are interested in herd behavior among
the same type of Japanese banks. The paper and the present one thus
focus on diﬀerent aspects of herd behavior. They are not substitutes but
complements.
The contribution of the present paper is apparent from the fact that it
presents the first evidence of herd behavior among banks. To our knowl-
edge, the only empirical papers on bank herding are Jain and Gupta[13] and
Nakagawa and Uchida[18] cited above. While they are interested in causal-
ity between amounts of loans aggregated by bank type, the use of the LSV
measure enables us to detect herding at an individual bank level. So far, the
measure has been applied exclusively to detect herding in financial markets.
However, banks are as much likely to follow herd behavior as fund managers
or investors in financial markets. A small number of banks and opaque na-
ture of loans due to informational asymmetry and uncertainty would serve
as a good field for herd behavior to take place among banks. The results do
confirm this prediction.
Furthermore, the present paper contains some theoretical contribution
over the existing studies since LSV. We have constructed a formal procedure
to test the statistical significance of the herd behavior detected by the LSV
measure. In the literature, some studies have paid little attention to the
statistical testing, and the procedure presented in other studies is not reliable
for a small sample analysis. The present paper formally investigates the
testing procedure and proposes a Chi-squared statistic which is applicable
to small sample analysis.
The rest of this paper is composed as follows. The next section explains
data to be used. Section 3 introduces the LSV measure and reports the
results. Our Chi-squared test is also explained in the section. In section 4,
we proceed with the analysis of rationality in Japanese banks’ herd behavior.
Since the behavior of city banks in the late 1980s turns out to be of particular
interest, we will focus on the period and conduct further analysis in section
5. The final section concludes the paper.
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2 Data
The main data to be used in this paper are loans outstanding by industry,
which are available from the Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File.
Loans to the following eleven industries by individual banks are respectively
available: (1) manufacturing, (2) agriculture, forest and fisheries, (3) mining,
(4) construction, (5) wholesale and retail trade, (6) finance and insurance,
(7) real estate, (8) transport and communication (9) electricity, gas, heat
supply and water, (10) services, and (11) individuals and others.4
We focus on two types of commercial banks in Japan. One is city banks
which have a main branch in big cities and operate nationwide as well as
multinationally. They are biggest banks in Japan and mainly deal with big-
ger businesses. Their lines of operation include not only commercial banking
but also some securities activities and international banking. The other is
regional banks which have main oﬃces in local cities and operate mainly
inside the prefectures they locate. They are small- or medium-sized banks
and closely connected to local businesses and local governments. Note that
there are banks called ’second regional banks’ which have transformed them-
selves from mutual banks around 1992. As they have similar characteristics
to regional banks, we treat them together as ’regional banks’ in the present
paper.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for city and regional banks. We
confirm that the former is larger in size and smaller in number than the
latter. Due to the small number of city banks, if we put the two samples
together, the results are almost the same as those for regional banks only.
We therefore conducted separate analysis for city and regional banks.
The data is available from fiscal year 1975 through 2002. This allows
us to investigate herd behavior in several interesting periods. First of all,
it includes the bubble period from the late 1980s through the beginning of
1990s in which land and stock prices inflated. As Table 1 demonstrates,
loans surged in this period, which recalls the existence of herding. Second,
the period of the bubble corruption is included in the sample. Herding
among Japanese banks in this panic period might be as plausible as that
among fund managers in the period of international currency crisis. Third,
the period of financial liberalization in the 1980s is included. In this period,
Japanese banks had lost their traditional borrowers who were freed from
regulation and obtained other financing sources. Banks had to expand loans
4We excluded loans to local governments since they are determined mainly by demand
side.
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to borrowers with less information accumulation. Fourth, the sample period
contains the stagnation period in the 1990s when the Japanese economy
had been struggling to escape from its weak economic condition. Banks
uniformly decreased loans in this period. Finally, the second oil crisis in
1979 is included in the period as well. We will interpret the results based
on this historical background of interest.
3 Results from LSV herding measure
3.1 LSV herding measure
We detect herd behavior among Japanese banks using the herding measure
invented by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny[17] (LSV). Suppose that at
each year indexed by t = 1975, ..., 2002, banks have loans outstanding to
industries j = 1, ..., 11. For notational simplicity, denote by i the index of
each industry-year which is defined by a combination of one t and one j.
The LSV herding measure is defined as follows.
LSVi ≡ |Pi − Pt|− E|Pi − Pt|. (1)
Pi is the proportion of banks who actually increased their loans outstanding
in industry-year i (of industry j in year t), which is derived as,
Pi ≡ Xi/Ni,
where Ni and Xi are the numbers of banks who were active in the industry-
year i, and who increased loans outstanding in the industry-year i, respec-
tively.
Pt is the expected proportion of banks who increase their loans outstand-
ing in year t, which is calculated as a mean of all the observed Pis in the year.
This can be considered as banks’ overall lending policy. If every bank in-
dependently increases (or decreases) its loans outstanding in industry-year
i with probability Pt (or 1 − Pt), the observed value of Pi would become
close to Pt and the first term will become zero if there is a large number of
banks. If, on the other hand, banks collectively increase or decrease loans
in the industry-year, the observed value departs from Pt. The first term of
(1) thus numerizes the extent to which banks’ lending policies deviate on
average from the overall policy.
The overall lending policy Pt thus represents the null hypothesis of no
herding. Both non-independent corrective increase and decrease amount to
a larger value of the first absolute value term and the measure itself. It is
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this sense of herd behavior that the LSV measure tries to capture. As we are
interested in the change in banks’ lending behavior over the sample period,
we obtain a sample mean of the LSV measure over 11 industries in each year
and analyze the time series of the mean. For regional and city banks, we
use Pt separately derived from the respective samples.
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Note that even if the null hypothesis holds and there exists no herding,
the expectation of the first absolute term of LSVi is positive. The last term
E|Pi − Pt| is subtracted so as to normalize the measure and make its mean
zero under the null hypothesis of no herding.
3.2 Results
The sample means of the LSV measure obtained for 1975 through 2002 are
represented in Table 2. They are also depicted in Figure 1. For regional
banks, the results show the existence of consistent herding. The extent
of herding had been even increasing from 2000. We observe about 10%
of collective deviation from the year average lending policy. It is worth
mentioning that this magnitude is bigger than that observed for mutual
fund managers in existing studies. In Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny[17],
Wermers[22], and Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers[10], for example, most
of the figures are less than 5%.
The results for city banks make a good contrast. As shown in Figure 1,
they seem to follow a cyclical herding pattern. Of particular interest is the
result that herding is observed during the bubble period in the late 1980s
and the collapse and stagnation period that followed. It is worth noting that
in these periods, herding among city banks was severer than regional banks.
It is also interesting to observe a sudden drop of herding in 1990. Upon
close inspection of the LSV measure for each industry in this year, it turned
out that almost all the city banks increased loans outstanding to all the
industries in this year, which makes Pt large and |Pi − Pt| small. This una-
nimity may also be regarded as herd behavior in a sense diﬀerent from what
the LSV measure tries to capture. Although our interest in the present paper
is herd behavior in the latter sense, further analysis about this unanimity
would be an interesting future topic.
A big magnitude of herding can be found in 1979 as well when Japan
was hit by the second oil crisis. Together with the results in the bubble
period, these results are consistent with our image of banks frantic enough
to herd in these ’abnormal’ circumstances. However, we cannot conclude so
5We also conducted analyses by taking the average over the whole sample. The results
were almost the same.
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at this level of analysis because rational factors aﬀecting herd behavior are
not adjusted for, which is to be conducted in section 4.
As for the first half of the 1980s, the period of financial liberalization,
we do not find serious herding. This is consistent with the results of Uchida
and Tsutsui[21]. They found that the degree of competition for city banks
became fierce after 1980. Until the late 1980s in which the bubble began
to form, the shape of Figure 1 looks similar to their Figure 2 which depicts
the degree of competition. The results of consistent herding among regional
banks and less frequent herding in a smaller extent among city banks are also
in line with the results obtained in Uchida and Tsutsui[21]. They report that
regional banks were consistently under less stringent competitive pressure
than city banks throughout the period.
Finally, in the late 1990s, city banks in Japan had gotten into the pe-
riod of severe consolidation. As Table 1 shows, the number of city banks
decreased due to big mergers. Consistent with this background, they ceased
to herd after 1997.
3.3 Statistical testing of LSV measure
3.3.1 Conventional test and distribution of LSV measure
In this subsection, we take a side trip to investigate statistical significance of
the herding detected by the LSV measure. We propose a Chi-squared test
which is suitable for small sample analysis. In some existing studies thus
far, careful treatment of statistical testing has been out of concern and the
focus was only on economic significance or the magnitude of the measure.6 In
other studies which do mention about statistical significance of the measure,
the standard t test has been conventionally applied. Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny[17], Kim and Wei[16, 15], Borensztein and Gelos[4], and Choe
et al.[11] present the standard errors or even t values of sample means of
the measure. Based on these values, they judge the statistical significance
of the measure or the existence of herd behavior.7
6No explicit comments are made about statistical significance of the measure in Grin-
blatt, Titman, and Wermers[10] and Gelos and Wei[9].
7Another interesting attempt is Wermers[22]. He depicts in Figure 1 an actual (es-
timated) distribution of the LSV measure and compares it with a simulated one ob-
tained from suﬃciently large number of samples under the null hypothesis of no herding.
Wermers[22] find the diﬀerence in shape between these two distributions and concluded in
favor of the existence of herding. Borensztein and Gelos[4] also takes the same approach.
Although this is indeed an interesting approach, it depends upon visual perception and is
not an objective test.
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It is highly probable, however, that the conventional test has a consid-
erable small sample bias in the present paper. We can confirm this simply
by investigating the probability distribution of the LSV measure. Suppose
that there is no herding for an industry-year i. Then, Pi follows a binominal
distribution with mean Pt and variance Pt(1−Pt)/Ni. If Ni, the number of
banks, is suﬃciently large, we can approximate this binominal distribution
to the normal distribution with the same mean and variance, which is con-
ventionally allowed if NiPt > 5 and Ni(1 − Pt) > 5.8 This approximation
implies that the first term of the LSV measure, |Pi−Pt|, follows a half-normal
distribution, and thus the distribution of the measure (1) considerably skews
leftward. Therefore, when we test a sample mean of the LSV measure using
the conventional test, reliable results cannot be obtained without the help
of the central limit theorem. That is, only when there are a large number
of industry-years (or stock-quarters in mutual fund studies) as well as a
large number of banks (or fund managers), the sample mean approximately
follows a normal distribution and the conventional test is reliable.
As long as the existing studies on fund managers are concerned, this
condition seems to be satisfied, since they have a large enough number of
stock-quarters and fund managers. As for small samples like ours, however,
we cannot be sure if the testing results obtained from the conventional test
are reliable. In the following, therefore, we devise a test procedure that
does not suﬀer from the small sample bias, which could enhance the test
reliability over the conventional test.
3.3.2 Chi-squared test for LSV measure
Now define a variable Zi as,
Zi ≡
Pi − Ptp
Pt(1− Pt)/Ni
.
From (1), this equals (the non-absolute value of) the first term of the LSV
measure which is normalized for its variance to take the value of 1 under the
null hypothesis of no herding. From the discussion above, we know that the
approximation of Zi ∼ N(0, 1) is allowed when NiPt > 5 and Ni(1−Pt) > 5.
This leads to the result that
Z2i ∼ χ(1). (2)
This is the statistic we propose to test the significance of the herding detected
by the LSV measure. When we test the statistical significance of herding
8See Rice[19, p.172].
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for a group of industry-years Φ (or a sample mean of the LSV measure over
Φ), we can use the relationship that
Z2Φ ≡
X
i∈Φ
Z2i ∼ χ(I),
where I is the number of industry-years included in Φ. Note that as absolute
values and squared values correspond each other, we have a close correspon-
dence between Z2i and the LSV measure, and between Z
2
Φ and a sample
mean of the LSV measure.
It should be stressed here that in order to derive the probability distri-
bution of the Chi-squared statistic Z2i (or the sum Z
2
Φ), we do not rely on
the normal approximation of a sample mean of the LSV measure which is
only justified with a large number of samples. Even if we are interested in
herding among a small number of industry-years (i.e. small I), as long as
the normal approximation of a binominal distribution of Pi is allowed, Z
2
i
statistic would be more reliable than the conventional t statistic.9 The use
of the former together with the latter would improve the reliability of the
test.
3.3.3 Results for statistical significance
The test results with the t and the Chi-squared statistics are presented in
Table 3. For both tests, results of the statistical significance represented
by the P values parallels those of economic significance represented by the
sample means of the LSV measure. For regional banks, we can reject the
null hypothesis of no herding for the entire sample period, while a cyclical
herding pattern is observed for city banks. We can therefore confirm the
conclusion in section 3.2 from a statistical point of view.
Note that the two tests reveal some diﬀerence. P values from the t test
are larger in general than those from the Chi-squared test. The conventional
test has a bias toward accepting the null hypothesis of no herding. As was
expected above, this implies that the Chi-squared test could avoid the small
sample bias of the t test.10
We can thus conclude that the conventional t test is unreliable for small
sample analysis, and that the Chi-squared test could make an improvement
over the conventional one. Although the conventional testing is indeed easy
9For the case in which even the normal approximation of a binominal distribution is
not allowed, see section 3.3.4.
10In section 4.2, we will confirm this point in a clearer way.
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and convenient, and appeals to our intuition, it may accompany a loss of
test eﬃciency and may bias the result for a small sample.
3.3.4 Test for further small sample
If we have very small Ni, which is indeed the case for city banks, the con-
ventional criteria NiPt > 5 and Ni(1− Pt) > 5 do not hold and the normal
approximation of the binominal distribution may not be accepted. In this
case, even the Chi-squared test might not be appropriate. Without relying
upon this normal approximation, however, it is too diﬃcult to derive the
probability distribution of a sample mean of the LSV measure under the
null hypothesis of no herding.
As a second best test which supports the Chi-squared one, we conducted
a test for each LSVi one by one. Since we do not know the exact distribution
of a sample mean of the LSV measure, it is indeed impossible to test the
significance of them in this case. However, we do know the exact binominal
distribution of each Pi − Pt under the null hypothesis of no herding, which
makes it possible to test the significance of the statistic for each industry-
year. We calculated the P value of Pi − Pt one by one from the binominal
distribution and find out for what proportion of industry-years the null
hypothesis of no herding is rejected in each year. Although it is not a
perfect test, at least it helps us to evaluate the results.
The results of this test for city banks are reported in Table 4. Consistent
with what we observed in Figure 1, the proportion of industry-years for
which the null hypothesis is rejected fluctuates with the magnitude of the
LSV measure itself. The conclusion in section 3.2 is thus supported.
4 Causes of herding
4.1 Rationality in herding and adjusted LSV measure
We are interested in whether banks are irrationally following herd behavior.
Even if the LSV measure indicates the existence of herding, it does not
necessary imply that the banks are irrational. What the LSV measure tries
to quantify is the extent of banks’ collective deviation from each year’s
average lending policy. Rational behavior could lead to this deviation. For
example, if there are growing industries and declining industries, rational
banks would collectively increase loans to the former and decrease to the
latter. Growing fund-raising demand from the former industry and shrinking
demand from the latter would also lead to non-irrational herding.
11
Institutional factors could also lead to the deviation. In Japan, for exam-
ple, diﬀerent financial liberalization measures had been taken in the 1980s,
which enabled firms to obtain funds from the sources other than banks.
If the impact of these measures had been diﬀerent across industries, loans
to industries which had benefited most would have decreased by a larger
amount. As our interest is in the extent to which banks herd irrationally,
we adjust for herding based on rational or institutional grounds.
Since Pt is already subtracted in (1), however, we do not have to adjust
for macroeconomic factors that uniformly aﬀect each bank’s lending policy.
For example, if financial liberalization had had impacts on loans to all in-
dustries, it would have been reflected in a smaller Pt and does not aﬀect the
average value of LSVi. In this sense, Pt represents overall macroeconomic
or institutional factors. Furthermore, we do not have to adjust for many
specific factors as existing studies do on fund manager herding. Existing
studies investigate herding at an individual stock level. Factors specific to
each stock must be taken into account in their studies. In contrast, due to
the semi-macro nature of the data, we do not have to adjust for those factors
such as future profitability, fund-raising demand, and accounting flaws of a
specific borrower. Only industry level adjustment is necessary here.
In order to eliminate rational or institutional portion of herding, we
estimate the following equation by OLS.
Pi − Pt = aXi + ²i, (3)
where Xi is a vector of industry level control variables. ²i represents the
after adjustment deviation from the year average lending policy that cannot
be explained by rational or institutional factors. In other words, ²i captures
the portion of herding which cannot be explained by non-irrational factors.
We can therefore quantify the extent of herding after adjustment by the
following measure.
LSV Ai ≡ |²i|− E|²i|.
Averaging this adjusted measure over each year, we can grasp the extent of
irrational herding in the year.11
The statistical significance of this measure can be tested in a similar
manner to the test of LSVi. Define Wi as follows.
Wi ≡
²ip
Pt(1− Pt)/Ni
.
11Note that as Pt is calculated as a mean of Pi in each year, we do not need a constant
term in the right hand side of (3). In fact, estimation results with a constant term improve
little from those without it.
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As Wi follows the standard normal distribution, under the null hypothesis
of no herding, we obtain the following relationship,
W 2Φ ≡
X
i∈Φ
W 2i ∼ χ2(I −K),
where Φ is the relevant group of industry-years, I is the number of industry-
years included in Φ, and K is the number of explanatory variables of the
regression (3).
As a control variable Xi, we adopt the relative magnitudes of economic
activities of the eleven industries in the Japanese economy. They are proxied
by the real GDP growth by industry for ten industries and the growth rate of
real final consumption expenditure of households for individuals and others.
The data are available from the Annual Report on National Accounts.12
Additionally, we take into account the impact of financial liberalization
as an institutional factor. The diﬀerence in the liberalization impact can be
proxied by the rate of increase in corporate bonds outstanding. As we were
able to obtain the rate only for total bonds and not for individual industries,
however, we constructed a variable which is a product of the rate of increase
in total bonds outstanding and a dummy variable for traditional industries
which takes value of 1 for manufacturing and wholesale industries. As Naka-
gawa and Uchida[18] demonstrate, loan shares to these two industries which
had been banks’ main customers decreased drastically after financial liber-
alization. It is therefore highly probable that firms in these two industries
benefited from financial liberalization and gained independence from banks.
Corporate bonds outstanding are the sum of outstanding corporate bonds,
asset-backed bonds, and convertible bonds. They are available from the
Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly by the Bank of Japan.
Another possible institutional factor which might have had diﬀerent im-
pacts on loans to diﬀerent industries could be the bad loan problem in the
1990s. However, it turned out that most of the herding in this period is
eliminated by the above two control variables. This might imply that the
impacts of bad loans are uniform among industries and reflected in Pt. Thus
we did not include any other explanatory variables.
12We also considered the use of stock price indices by industry which is available from
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Because of the mismatch of the industry classification and
the limited availability (only after 1983), we decided not to use them.
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4.2 Results
The sample means of herding measures adjusted for rational and institu-
tional factors are presented in Table 5. Figure 2 depicts the measures to-
gether with those without the adjustment. The diﬀerence between the bold
line and the dotted line for respective type of banks represents the portion
of herding which was adjusted by rational or institutional factors.
For regional banks, we see only a small part of herding was due to rational
or institutional factors. Still a big magnitude of adjusted herding measure
manifests itself consistently. The P values from the Chi-squared test reveal
that they are significant not only economically but also statistically. We can
therefore conclude that it is highly probable that regional banks had been
consistently following irrational herd behavior.
In contrast, most of the herd behavior by city banks can be explained on
rational or institutional grounds. As for herding in the late 1970s and the
early 1990s, Figure 2 tells us that purely irrational herding was economically
insignificant and non-irrational herding was dominant, although the Chi-
squared test results tell us that the former was still statistically significant.
We can therefore conclude that city banks’ herding were not irrational in
most of the sample period.
The interesting exception is the late 1980s, however. Even after adjust-
ing for rational and institutional factors, we still observe a large extent of
herding. It is also worthwhile to note here that in this period, the extent of
herding had been severer for city banks than for regional banks. Needless to
say, this is nothing but the period when the bubble was formed. As Table 1
tells us, city banks has been playing bigger role in supplying funds in Japan.
The result here might thus imply that irrational bank behavior could have
caused or accelerated the bubble formation.
It is worth noting about the diﬀerence in the two testing results. The
conventional t test produces larger P values than the Chi-squared test. This
result is more apparent than that observed in Table 3. We could therefore
confirm the earlier statement that the Chi-squared test reduces the small
sample bias of the conventional test.13
Finally, we should mention about the result for city banks in 1990. The
adjusted measure again drops oﬀ in this year. The reason is the same as
that for before adjustment: even after the adjustment, almost all the city
banks increased loans outstanding to all the industries. This phenomenon
13The binominal test for samples with very small Ni was also conducted in a manner
similar to section 3.3.4. As was the case in Table 4, the results were in line with those by
the Chi-squared test.
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would again be interesting to be pursued independently.
5 Further analysis for city banks in the bubble
period
Among interesting results obtained thus far, lending behaviors of city banks
in the bubble period (1986-1989) draws special attention. As we see in
Figure 2, the results indicate that city banks had been following irrational
herd behavior in this period. Since they were dominant in the Japanese loan
market, which can be confirmed from Table 1, their irrational behavior could
have had a big impact on the Japanese economy. To clarify their behaviors in
further details, we focus only on city banks and conduct analysis by industry
in this period.
It is our common belief that there was a huge influx of loans from city
banks to construction, real estate, and non-bank industries. In Figure 3, we
depict city banks’ average increase in outstanding loans by industry from
1986 through 1989. Diﬀerent from our common belief, the top two indus-
tries which experienced the biggest increase are services and individual and
others, which are followed by real estate and finance and insurance. As Nak-
agawa and Uchida[18] indicate, these industries are relatively new customers
for banks after traditional borrowers gained independence from bank loans
due to financial liberalization. Loans to these industries rose, whereas those
to traditional borrowers such as manufacturing and wholesale decreased or
did not increase a lot. These can be confirmed by Figure 4 which depicts
city banks’ average loans outstanding by industry.
We calculated a sample mean of the LSV measure by industry over the
period from 1986 through 1989. The results are shown in Figure 5. As for
new borrowers such as real estate, services, and individual and others, on
one hand, we can see that the increase in outstanding loans represented in
Figure 3 can be attributed to herd behavior. In other words, city banks had
been collectively deviating from each year’s average lending policy to lend
to these industries. Furthermore, a large portion of this herding is not based
on rational or institutional grounds. On the other hand, a decrease in loans
to manufacturing industry is also identified as herding. Although most of
the decrease was based on rational or institutional grounds, a great extent
of irrational herding still remains.14
14Mining is exceptional in the extent of herding, and so are agriculture, forest and
fisheries in the sign of the measure. Although it is diﬃcult to interpret these results,
judging from the amount of total loans outstanding (Figure 4), these industries could be
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We should stress that we see, on average, consistent irrational herding
over industries. Of particular interest is the result that in spite of the dif-
ference in the direction and the amount of changes in loans outstanding
(Figure 3), the extent of irrational herding was not very much diﬀerent
over industries (right columns in Figure 5).15 Among these comparable ex-
tents of irrationality, we can see that loans to banks’ new customers after
the financial liberalization (real estate, services, and individuals and others)
represent a relatively greater extent of herding than traditional borrowers
such as manufacturing and wholesale. This diﬀerence is consistent with
the results of Nakagawa and Uchida[18], which obtained herding between
diﬀerent types of banks for loans to traditional industries in the 1980s.
In summary, the results in this section confirm those obtained in the last
section. Even a closer look at the behavior of city banks reveals irrational
herding in the late 1980s. In spite of the diﬀerence in circumstances each
industry had faced which could naturally lead to diﬀerent results on herding,
a large and comparable extent of irrational herding were observed across
industries. It is therefore highly likely that behavior of city banks in this
period could have been abnormal and contributed to the formation of the
bubble.
6 Conclusion
For the purpose of investigating herd behavior among Japanese banks, we
calculated the herding measure invented by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
[17] (LSV). The results were contrasting for regional banks and city banks.
Consistent herding was observed for regional banks during the period from
1975 to 2002, whereas city banks had followed cyclical pattern of herding.
Even after adjusting for rational or institutional factors that are contained
in the original measure, consistency for regional bank herding was still ob-
served. In contrast, herd behavior by city bank was mainly due to the
non-irrational factors. However, the results indicative of irrationality was
still obtained for city banks in the late 1980s, which implies that their herd
behavior in this period might have caused or accelerated the formation of
the bubble.
A few interesting issues remains unchallenged in this paper. First of all,
the study about the aﬀect of irrationality is not dealt with in this paper.
disregarded.
15Again mining and agriculture, forest and fisheries are the exceptions but they could
be neglected.
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Although it was shown that city banks were highly likely to be irrational in
the bubble period, we do not know how the irrational behavior could have
contributed to the formation of the bubble. Second, we should note that
there might be herd behavior that cannot be captured by the LSV measure.
This point was clarified by our results for the year 1990. In this year, almost
all the city banks increased their loans to all the industries. Whether these
unanimous increases are based on rational grounds or not is an interesting
issue to be clarified.
The financial system in Japan had long been bank-oriented and banks
had been playing big roles in the economy. The existence of herding among
Japanese banks obtained in this paper is thus as important as that among
fund managers in the US, whose system is market-oriented. Of particular
interest is the result that city banks might have followed irrational herd
behavior in the late 1980s. The present paper demonstrated the possibility
of applying the method of analysis for herd behavior among fund managers
to that among banks. In order to obtain some lesson from the Japanese
experience of the bubble, it would be interesting to apply the same analysis
to other bank-oriented economies.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Sum
(million yen)
% of
increase Standard dev.
Sum
(million yen)
% of
increase Standard dev.
1975 131 39,253,944 N/A 252,361 13 49,189,620 N/A 1,564,605
1976 131 44,219,168 11.2% 278,317 13 54,014,828 8.9% 1,710,491
1977 131 49,013,308 9.8% 306,742 13 58,637,696 7.9% 1,847,785
1978 131 54,862,620 10.7% 340,936 13 63,552,000 7.7% 1,987,202
1979 131 59,715,620 8.1% 368,647 13 67,797,904 6.3% 2,096,531
1980 131 64,526,308 7.5% 400,073 13 72,688,344 6.7% 2,254,312
1981 131 71,359,984 9.6% 449,917 13 79,662,600 8.8% 2,476,634
1982 131 77,983,912 8.5% 499,816 13 87,230,416 8.7% 2,703,866
1983 131 84,740,944 8.0% 550,787 13 96,076,776 9.2% 3,058,792
1984 131 92,493,936 8.4% 613,725 13 107,203,144 10.4% 3,524,636
1985 131 96,230,544 3.9% 642,893 13 117,996,920 9.1% 4,024,413
1986 131 101,539,608 5.2% 690,261 13 130,671,192 9.7% 4,739,763
1987 131 110,406,480 8.0% 772,800 13 143,321,168 8.8% 5,298,933
1988 131 121,559,056 9.2% 868,531 13 155,045,328 7.6% 5,858,197
1989 131 136,866,944 11.2% 982,045 13 170,581,936 9.1% 6,398,479
1990 131 164,777,504 16.9% 1,201,693 12 213,880,912 20.2% 9,460,265
1991 131 172,436,192 4.4% 1,255,549 11 219,916,704 2.7% 8,855,080
1992 130 177,709,936 3.0% 1,290,116 11 224,873,088 2.2% 8,898,931
1993 129 180,294,320 1.4% 1,299,759 11 223,369,696 -0.7% 8,765,856
1994 129 183,783,216 1.9% 1,308,175 11 219,627,360 -1.7% 8,612,132
1995 129 188,678,608 2.6% 1,318,976 11 218,059,264 -0.7% 8,442,313
1996 128 188,975,248 0.2% 1,310,307 10 216,077,312 -0.9% 8,315,518
1997 126 189,692,640 0.4% 1,310,875 9 208,668,560 -3.6% 6,693,437
1998 124 190,525,280 0.4% 1,325,869 9 211,083,056 1.1% 7,095,465
1999 122 183,478,512 -3.8% 1,290,572 8 187,518,336 -12.6% 7,174,783
2000 117 179,496,176 -2.2% 1,315,798 8 185,922,912 -0.9% 6,717,941
2001 115 176,824,848 -1.5% 1,319,023 6 149,091,520 -24.7% 9,791,975
2002 113 173,431,872 -2.0% 1,329,087 4 126,880,240 -17.5% 7,392,440
Source: The Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File.
Year # of
banks
# of
banks
City banksRegional banks
Loans outstanding Loans outstanding
Table 2  Mean LSV Measure
Regional banks City banks
1975 0.0918 0.0077
1976 0.1101 0.0323
1977 0.0697 -0.0033
1978 0.0750 0.0543
1979 0.0940 0.0942
1980 0.0741 0.0297
1981 0.0488 0.0135
1982 0.0499 0.0045
1983 0.0721 0.0365
1984 0.0705 0.0296
1985 0.1203 0.0311
1986 0.1240 0.1243
1987 0.1009 0.1429
1988 0.0684 0.1156
1989 0.1051 0.0849
1990 0.0837 -0.0069
1991 0.0975 0.1290
1992 0.0732 0.0930
1993 0.0842 0.1122
1994 0.0814 0.1084
1995 0.0974 0.1332
1996 0.1347 0.1118
1997 0.0587 0.0623
1998 0.0699 0.0397
1999 0.1207 0.0202
2000 0.0975 0.0108
2001 0.1518 -0.0087
2002 0.2177 0.0114
Note: Sample means of the LSV herding
measure are shown.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Mean LSV
Year
Table 3  Statistical Significance of Herding
P -value
from
 t  test
P -value
from
Chi2 test
P -value
from
 t  test
P -value
from
Chi2 test
1975 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.11
1976 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04
1977 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.65
1978 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1980 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06
1981 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.00
1982 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.33
1983 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03
1984 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.03
1985 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.01
1986 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1987 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
1988 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
1989 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
1990 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.75
1991 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1992 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
1993 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
1994 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
1995 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
1996 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
1997 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01
1998 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.13
1999 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.15
2000 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.31
2001 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.29
2002 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.63
Note: P values from the Chi-squared test are shown.
Shadowed figures represent the results in which the null
hypothesis of no herding is rejected at a 5% significance
level.
Source: Authors' calculations.
City BanksRegional Banks
Year
Table 4  Significance Test based on Binominal Distribution
5% 10%
1975 1/11 1/11
1976 1/11 1/11
1977 0/11 0/11
1978 1/11 1/11
1979 1/11 1/11
1980 0/11 0/11
1981 1/11 1/11
1982 0/11 0/11
1983 1/11 1/11
1984 1/11 1/11
1985 1/11 1/11
1986 2/11 5/11
1987 5/11 5/11
1988 5/11 5/11
1989 4/11 4/11
1990 0/11 0/11
1991 3/11 4/11
1992 2/11 3/11
1993 4/11 5/11
1994 3/11 5/11
1995 4/11 4/11
1996 2/11 4/11
1997 1/11 3/11
1998 1/11 1/11
1999 1/11 1/11
2000 0/11 1/11
2001 1/11 1/11
2002 0/11 0/11
Significance level
Note: The number of the industries (out of total 11) for which
the null hypothesis of no herding is rejected are shown. Years
with more than two rejections are highlighted.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Year
Table 5  Mean Adjusted LSV Measure
Mean
LSV
P -value
from
t  test
P -value
from
Chi2 test
Mean
LSV
P -value
from
t  test
P -value
from
Chi2 test
1975 0.0721 0.00 0.00 -0.0037 0.57 0.11
1976 0.0663 0.01 0.00 0.0160 0.22 0.04
1977 0.0691 0.00 0.00 -0.0107 0.88 0.58
1978 0.0623 0.00 0.00 0.0284 0.25 0.00
1979 0.0581 0.02 0.00 0.0412 0.13 0.00
1980 0.0585 0.02 0.00 0.0160 0.20 0.06
1981 0.0221 0.08 0.00 0.0060 0.42 0.00
1982 0.0437 0.02 0.00 0.0041 0.25 0.29
1983 0.0605 0.02 0.00 0.0204 0.13 0.05
1984 0.0580 0.01 0.00 0.0153 0.24 0.03
1985 0.0716 0.00 0.00 -0.0167 0.83 0.56
1986 0.0879 0.00 0.00 0.0549 0.09 0.00
1987 0.0895 0.00 0.00 0.1095 0.01 0.00
1988 0.0652 0.01 0.00 0.1107 0.00 0.00
1989 0.0927 0.00 0.00 0.0829 0.03 0.00
1990 0.0635 0.00 0.00 -0.0180 0.95 0.74
1991 0.0893 0.00 0.00 0.0294 0.20 0.04
1992 0.0746 0.00 0.00 0.0282 0.19 0.08
1993 0.0646 0.00 0.00 0.0519 0.16 0.00
1994 0.0777 0.00 0.00 0.0295 0.26 0.01
1995 0.0497 0.02 0.00 0.0324 0.24 0.01
1996 0.0923 0.00 0.00 0.0707 0.06 0.00
1997 0.0499 0.01 0.00 0.0709 0.07 0.00
1998 0.0436 0.07 0.00 0.0180 0.30 0.13
1999 0.0686 0.03 0.00 -0.0041 0.55 0.28
2000 0.0636 0.04 0.00 -0.0016 0.52 0.19
2001 0.0997 0.02 0.00 -0.0106 0.59 0.18
2002 0.1527 0.00 0.00 -0.0273 0.78 0.63
City banks
Year
Note: Sample means of the adjusted LSV measure and respective P values are shown.
Shadowed figures represent the results in which the null hypothesis of no herding is
rejected at a 5% significance level.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Regional banks
Figure 1  Mean LSV Measure: Regional and City Banks
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Figure 2  Mean Adjusted and Unadjusted LSV Measures: Regional and City Banks
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Figure 3  Average Amount of Increase in  Loans Outstanding by Industry (City Banks)
Source: Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File.
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Figure 4  Average Loans Outstanding by Induatry (City Banks)
Source: Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File.
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Figure 5  Mean LSV Herding Measure by Industry (Bubble Period (1986-1989), City Banks)
Source: Authors' calculations.
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